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Introduction 
Jl Q...4-CL ra "' I "._J) 
In the late nineteen-thirties 11isolationism11 1M•l:· I- tiDt American a.t-
titude~toward Europe. Basically, the term, used to describe that period, 
v.thi~ ~ .. c..,..~t...& 
refers to the belie.ts"Jt.hat the United States should h~ve no part in 
foreign q~arrels. 
T'nis paper will attempt to analyzo the feelings of the majority 
of Americans. Many ffiOn counselled non-involvement tor many reasons, and 
e:xtre~~sts ranged from thd Catholic priest, Father Coughlin, a man with 
definite pro-German sympathies, to Charles A. Lindberg, who thought that 
Hitler could not be beaten. Attention here will not be directed at theso 
extre:nely small fringe groups, but at the "average" American, as far as 
his thoughts can be known, and at the political leaders of the period, 
as far as they allow th6ir thoughts to be known. 
Heither will an attempt be r:i.a.de to de5cribe geographical variations 
in tho stren!!th of ieolation:i.sm, for tne polls do not reveal signifi-
cant differences in reactions to events. They show that the !-iiddle and 
+~Ls ~~; lo.ro .. 
Far West tended to be slightly stronger in their adherence to tlole ee.n-i'- ' 
#, , 
-?~t.. 
~s than were the East nnd South, and ~ observation is s~pported 
by the fact that isolationist leaders in Congress represented the former 
areas. The data, however, are not sufficient to permit any further gen-
eralizat.ion. 
Chapter 1 
The Mood Before Munich 
Isolationism came to a peak in the turmoil of the thirties. both at 
hom$ and abroad. The emotional shock of the Depression coupled with the 
aggressive activittes of new despots in Europe and Asia convinced Am.eri-
can' that they should concentrate on rdconetructing their own demoralized 
country. As the decade wore on the conviction grew that strong legal 
b.1r:::-iers should be erected to keep the United State~ freo of all foreign 
entn.nglemants. 
On May l, 193t Congref:a, led by its more extreme isolationist ele-
ments, passed the Neutrality Act. It decreed that, when war broke out 
abroad, the President should declare that hostilities existed, and upon 
his declaration a battery of restrictions would go into effect. In addi-
tion to outlawing all trade in munitions, the bill prohibited non-mili-
tary ccmmerce with belligerents on any basis other than "cash and carry." 
Section 3 said that no one would be allowed to deal in the bonds of or 
extend any credit to these countries. Even voluntary contributions were 
prohibited. In addition, the President could forbid the entry of any 
warship of a belligerent into United States ports, and no Americans~ 
ninety days after the initial proclame.tion, would be allowed to travel 
l 
on vessels of the warring countries. 
Behind this act stood the belief that the United States should have 
' . 
no foreign responsibilities outside the Western Hemisphere. According 
to the revisionist interpretation of World War I then popular, guilt tor 
starting the conflict lay equally on the sho~tlders of all combat.ah~ .. 
2 
The ide~ was carried even further, and some Americans claimed that 
Europe '.-ms incapable of solving her proble:ns pencefully, citing as evi-
dence t~1~ saber-rattling of :Utler and H1.lssolini. A ·writer summed up 
the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty 
2 
years a:ld it has done so since about the beginning of time. 11 
Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for 
the Allies? Three forces had played on her for three different reasons. 
Preside:it Wilson and his highest aides were warmongers. Britain and 
France had invested heavily in this country and thus roused the capita-
listic affections of big business. Combining with the manufacturers, 
o_,QJ)<k-\) 
the President a4e.e6 his battle cries to theirs and to those of the pro-
paganda flowing from Britain. As a result of this collusion, the Ameri-
can peonle were led to believe that they were embarking on a great cru-
sade. 
One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had 
been fruitless. American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they 
had lost the fight for ideals. At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau 
and Lloyd George revealed that the Central Powers had no monopoly on a 
desire f~r conquest. The vindictive settle:nent imposed there on Germany 
had as its purpose the gratification of French and British greed. In 
their lust for land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered 
and, therefore, directly created the conditions which were to produce 
Hitler. 
Americans believed they had something to learn from their World ';;ar I 
experience. They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies 
3 
had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for democracy than 
were the Central Powers. The country al~o remembered the horror of the 
world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and the mass violence 
seemed even worse, because it had been pointless. Senator Gerald P. 
Nye, usually an extre:nist, sum.~ed up public feeline when he said, early 
in 1939, "I r:iake bold to asse~that 20 years ago we were led like lambs 
to the slaughter into the most cruel and ~erciless and useless war the 
3 
world has ever witnessed." 
American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consis-
tent with Washington's pronounce:nents against entangling alliances. The 
President must stand for the ideals of democracy, he should preach those 
ideals to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement, 
and he should stay aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign 
4 
quarrels. 
Revisionism appealed to A.~erica in the thirties, because it re-
fleeted other basic beliefs then held. The country had entered World 
War I by voluntary choice, for it had not been ph~~jcally menaced. War 
twenty years later would be a repeat of the first, with airplanes and 
strategic bombing, but it would remain in Europe. If the country wanted 
to stay at peace, therefore, the oceans wo~ld protect her from attack, 
just as they always had. 
"~+; ..::>~ ..... 
And the oo:w:ltry would stay at peace. As Senator Atthur H. Van-
denburg said, " ••• We are not, we cannot be, the world's protector or the 
5 
world's policeman." As long as the United States could import the ne-
cessary raw materials, she could re~ain aloof from the perpetual foreign 
quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still 
unconquered. 
The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent 
blindness is, "You cannot wish an a'._".gressor away. 11 Unfortunately this 
lesson had to be taught by Hitler not onlJ• to America, but also to Eng-
land and France. In 193g, United States public opinion was shocked and 
alarmed by the ruthlessness of Nazism, whicn the people saw as the most 
SS ()C\.., +-1 u :' powerfQl form of oppression the world had yet produced, but the coantr, 
was n~t aware of the danger it posed. k~erican)considered Hitler a 
madman who had victimized the German people, but they hoped, as did the 
rest ~f the world, that he could be reasoned with. Few men realized the 
lengt.1s to which he was willing to go, nor did they know how far Germ.any 
would follow him. When the events of 1938-1939 gave a clear indication 
of his megalomania, Americans grew even more afraid of war. The fear 
was n~t, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she 
would once again be duped into renewing her crusade for democracy, a cru-
sade that no one could pursue without disaste~. 
Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say ex-
plains all of isolationism. Americans thought Britain and France, lead-
ing the smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war 
finally came. On September 13, 1938, a Gallup Poll reported that 86% 0 f I 
D 
those questioned had faith in the victory of the democracies. One year 
later, when Poland lay in ruins from the blitzkreig, 71% answered the 
7 
same question the same way. 
To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, how-
ever, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered all of Europe and ·;:e-
bo~cW.. ""En~i I\ 
a'd:e se :SPitaia to rt1:el.5re before the United States entere~ the war, and if, 
The ide~ was carried even turther, and some Americans claimed that 
Europe was incapable of solving her proble:ns peacefully, citing as evi-
dence t:1e saber-rattling or Hitler and Mussolini. A writer swruned up 
the comnon opinion by saying, "War occurs in Europe about every thirty 
. 2 
years a11d it has done so since about the boginning of time." 
Why, then, had the United States, a peace-loving nation, fought for 
the Allies? Three torcea had played on her tor three different reaaons. 
Prc£id.e;1t Wilson and hif' highef>t aides were warmongers. Britain and 
Fran::e had invested he~vily in this country ~:nd t~,,_t: r.)used the capita-
listic affectione of big business. Combining with the manufacturers, 
the President addes his battle cries to theirs and to those or tho pro-
paganda fiowing from Britain. As a rar.ult of this collusion, the Ameri-
can people were led to believe that they were embarking on a great cru-
sade. 
One essential point in revisionist theory was that the crusade had 
been fruitless. American troops had won the war for the Allies, but they 
had lost the fight tor ideals. At the Versailles Conference Clemenceau 
and Lloyi George raven.led that the Contx•nl Powars had no monopoly on a 
desire f~r conquest. The vindictive settlo~ent imposed tnere on Germany 
had az its purpose the gratification of French and British greed. In 
their lust tor land, they disregarded the well-being of the conquered 
and, therefore, directly created tho conditions which were to produce 
Hitler. 
Americans believed they had something to learn from their World r.-;ar I 
experienoe. They had sent troops to die for the Allies, and the Allies 
had proved no more dedicated to making the world safe for de~ocracy than 
were the Central Powers. The country al~;o remembered the horror of the 
world's first experience with mechanized warfare, and tne mass violence 
seemed even worse, because it had been pointl.,ss. Senator Gerald P. 
Nye, usually an extra:nint, s~~ed up public feeling when he said, early 
in 19391 "I r:iake bold to asset"hhat 20 years ago we were led like lambs 
to the slaughter into the rnost cruel and ;nerciltJss and useless war the 
3 
world has ever witnessed." 
American foreign policy, therefore, should pursue a course consis-
tent with Washington's prono:mce:nents against untaneling alliance"• The 
President mu3t stand for the ideals of de:11ocracy, he should preach those 
.igeale to the world, but he must never go beyond verbal encouragement, 
and he should stny aloof from even peaceful settlements of foreign 
4 
quarrels. 
Revisionism appealed to Araerica in tne t.hh·ties, be:ca.use it re-
fiected other basic belief's then held. The country haci. en~crad ·;.Jorld 
, 
War I by voluntary cnoice, for it had not been p~uicNJ.y menaced. War 
twenty years later wo\lld be a. repeat of the first, with airpla.nes and 
strategic lJombing, bl.lt it would remain in Ehrope. If the country ".·:anted 
to stay at peace., theref,,re, the oceans wo-.ll.d protect her i'rom attack., 
just as they always had. 
~+·,o" 
An1 the ae·:tR~r.T would. stay at peace. As Senator Ai:thur H. Van-
denburg said, " ••• We are not, we c&nnot be, the world's protector or the 
5 
world's policeman." As long as the United States could import the ne-
cessary raw materials, she could re~Jlin aloof from the perpetual foreign 
quarrels and solve her own problems, which included a depression still 
unconquered. 
1 
The first reaction of a child of the Atomic Age to such apparent 
blindness is, 11You cannot wish an aggressor away." Unfortunately this 
lesson had to be taught by Hitler not only to America, but also to Eng-
land and Fran~e. In 1933, United States public opinion ~as ~~ocketi and 
alar:ned by tha ruthlessness of Uazism, whicn tile people saw a5 the most 
't"'\o...4-i o" powerful form of oppression the world had ;rl!Jt produced, but tho • 11 "•b~ 
was n3t m:are of tho daz:ger it ~:>setl. Amoricaryconsidered tiitler a 
madman 1·1ho had victi:rl.zecl tne Geri:l<ln people, but th~y ho-ped, au did tho 
rest :>f the world, that he could be reasoned with. fow men realized the 
lengtas to which he was willing to go, nor did they know now far Germany 
would follow nim. When the events of 1938-1939 gava a clear indicntic-n 
of his megalomania, A.'llericans grew even more afraid of war. Tue foar 
was not, however, that the country would be attacked, but that she 
would onae again be duped into renewing her crU.l!ade for democracy, a cru-
sade t.nat no one could pursue \dthout ~t.. 
Joining these beliefs was another which the cynical may say ex-
plains all of isolat.ionis:n. Americans thougnt Britain and France, lead-
ing tl1e smaller, free European countries, could defeat the Axis, if war 
finally cam~. On ~eptember 13, 1933, a Gallup Poll rq:.orted tb~t 8G% 0 £ 
6 
those questioned had fuith in the vict.ory of the dcwocracies. On·~ year 
later., waen Poland lay in rllins from the blitzkreig, 71% answered t.he 
7 
same question the same way. 
To place too much emphasis on the importance of this belief, how-
ever, is to ignore the facts. Hitler conquered sll of Europe and'!'El-
bo ...... ~w 
.Qaaed Britain ta Ptteel:e before the iJnited States entered the war, and if, 
in 1941, anyone cherished the illusion th~t England could 3top the J\xis 
from European do::Unation, 1 t was a belief based on na inability to read 
the ne\rspapers. And yet the country dlci not intervc::ne, for isolationism 
was mo:re thar:. ju3t the opinion that Germany co:.111 bo beaten. 
The government which l~d the country shared many of these beliefs. 
Througrtout the following pages references to political decisions in Wash-
ineton will na.inly concern Roosevelt's attitudes. Willia..'Il Langer and 
Everett Gleason, in,~ Challenge !g Isoln.:t.ion:l9J7-1940, conri.f.m the, 
popular idea that th~ President was as indep~ndent iR'forsign policy as 
he wnR in d~mestia. For r.dvice l1e tarned. to Cordell Hull, the .::acre-
tary of State, Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, Secretary of tho 
Treasury Henry Horgenthau,Jr., Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and 
8 
Secret~ry of the Navy Claude A. Swanson. 
; ,... ·.\.\'\.i ~ 
Hull and Welles, the most important men ~~ study, seem to have 
varied in Roosevelt's attentions, for ne was more pDrsonally drawn to 
""",~ the latter and tended to snow tfti:e favoritism, a fact which infuriated 
Hull. Whatever the personality clashes, the President did depend on 
9 
his Secretary of State, and the two did share co~ill~n goals and methods. 
Tr1ese goals and ::1ethods inspired at the time considerable contro-
versy. A popular myth, propounded most vocally by extreme isolationists, 
V'lo- ... ~a.-""' ... ,.....&) 
relate3 that Roosevelt consciously ~ this country into war. 
This conspiracy theory echoes revisionist wishful thinking about Wilson, 
and it has little empirical backing. 'l'he President left no diary; he 
was abra.ys an enig!natic figure; so one searching !or his motives must be 
content with memoirs of first hand observers and with the record of the 
foreign policy he p~rsued. 
·,·:r1en fie took office in 1933 :1e obviuusly concentratc:d on tl1e aew 
Deal. Later, w:1.en isolationist frenzy produced the ;foutralit;;· Act, there 
10 
is no evidence that he tried to block it. Roosevelt was fresh 
fro:n a landslide election; r1e later considereJ Lh<J.t mane.late sufficient 
to a:;prove his packing of the Supre:ne Court. If he disagreed with the 
ideas of the legislation and yet kept silent, it was one of t.!.e few 
times in his career i1e did so. 
'foe evidence points to the fact that the President shared the i so-
lationist views of his country1nen until Llie ne\'iS fro;,, Zurope convinced 
him that he ha.d been wrong. Ovi:;r tL<::: course of 1933-1939 !1c: apparently 
never seriously considered sending J..rnerican truops auroa<l. If iit: <li<l 
plot in such a v;ay, he kept it a well guarded secret. 
This paper will be an at tempt to understand how the COi.rntry reacted 
to the events of the year that plunged Zurope into war. All who read 
must be cautioned against thinking in terms of facts alone. Isolationism 
was a mixture of rationality and emotion, and one simply cannot say the 
country weighed what it saw as the evidence and came to the conclusion 
that it need not become involved. The mood of the late thirties blended 
with political reality an intense fear of war, a. disillusion:nent with 
E'.lrope, and a faith that the 0ni~eJ Sta.tes would be all right if left 
alone. To disregard the complexities of thto.: era's thought is to do a 
disservice to the poeple who lived it. 
Chapter 2 
Fall, 1938 
The Munich Crisis began with methods of intimidation that were to 
become familiar to A.~ericans in the course of the next yenr. Hitler 
ranted about Czech atrocities against Germans in the Sudetenland, called 
for annexation of that territory on the gounds that it rightfully be-
longed to his country, fomented terrorism by Nazis there, and massed 
troops on the border. When war ~eemed inevitable, Neville Chamberlain1 
decided to intervene, flying to Godesburg on September 22, The mseting 
with Hitler was stormy, as the Gerrr~n dictator refused to make conces-
1 
sions and de.'D.anded evacuation of the frJ.detenland by September 28. 
The British Prime :·:iiuster ;naneged to convince him to set back the date 
to the first or October and then returned to London to confer with his 
cabinet. 
Meanwhile, England sent a message to the State Decartment asking 
Roosevelt for a state:nent approving Chamberlain• •s peace efforts. The 
President and his aides agreed that no such announcement would be made, 
,, " for it wo:.ild enable Britain to shift partial responsibility for any 
2 
settlement on the United States. 
The next few days saw the situation in Europe grow more desperate, 
and finally Roosevelt felt that he should take some action. Accordingly, 
a letter to Hitler was drafted, despite the disapproval of Hull. The 
SecretarJ of State thought force alone would change the dictator's mind, 
that an appeal coQld only inflate his already magnified opinion of his 
own power, and that as a result the United States would be branded an 
3 
appeaser. Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, 
had recorded in his diary as early as September 17 that top officials in 
The State Department feared Chamberlaine intended to sell Czechoslovakia 
4 
to buy peace. 
~'hen the situation reached the crisis stage on September 261 Roose-
~t."4 \4 t, 5 
velt'" letter •re:e eeft'b. He urged negotiation, but deleted from the 
State Department version of the message an offer of Ur.ited States• aid 
6 
in reaching a settlement. Instead, the President stressed American non-
involvement, writing, "The United States has no political entanglements. 
It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed 
7 
its civilization." 
Hitler's reply repeated his u~ual claims that Germany had been 
robbed in 1919. Sudeten Germans were being discriminated against, and 
no one could blame Germany if such atrocities forc6d her to go to war 
8 
for her people. 
On the night of September 26, th~ dictator renewed his violent de-
nunciations in the Sportzplatz in Berlin. Again, Roosevelt sent a ::ies-
sage proposing negotiation, and Hull cabelled United Stc..tes diploraats to 
encourage the governments with which they dealt to urge peaceful set-
9 
tle;nent. E;urope and ~r.'.lt::rica were terrified at the threat of wc.r, but, 
then, on 3e~tember 29, France, Great Brit~in, Italy, and Ger~any, confer-
,..-----.._ 
ring without the c~~reached an agreement to partition tte tiny 
country. 
Hull exJ)ressed the official United States government reaction in a 
press conference the next day. "As to immediate peace results .• l ., they 
they !}he terms of the settlemenfil afford a universal sense of relief 1 11 
10 
he said. He made no comment on those terms themselves. 
Jnlike the State Department, Roosevelt initially welcomed Ml1nich as 
11 
the first of r.iany negotiated settlements. He could not have cherished 
that nope long. On October 3, William c. Bullitt, ambassador to Paris, 
dispatched to Hµll : . ·Q. record or a conversation with Edouard Dala~~" 
•' "-'- f"Q... ~o > 
president of the French Council of Ministers,. "Dala.diejf. •• realizes fully 
that ~he meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France 
and England and recognizes that unless Frnnce can recover a united na-
tional spirit to confront the future a fetal situation will nrise within 
12 
the n~t year." Confirming this opinion of the settlement, Secretary 
of the Interior Hnrold L. Ickes wrote in his diary on October 9, "There 
is a vowing impreseion that the Czechoslovak solution was a totally 
13 
disgr'!ceful thing •••• " 
Press reaction to the Munich crisis was as uncertain as was that 
in Washington. Few observers fully grasped the true nature of Hitler's 
aggressiveness, no one was certain what he wanted, and many clung to the 
comforting thought that his declarations of protecting Germans were 
'J', genuine. l!!u! and Newsweek expressed the hope that the meeting had set 
14 
a pre:edent for future neeotiation of differences, : . .>:~·~-+tour other 
. ,/ 
major periodicals predicted that Hitler•s appetite hac been whette~ not 
15 
sated. 
~ 4-. i.kt,. the press, the A.'llerican people reacted ambivalently toward 
the crisis. The great majority thought Germany's claims were unjusti-
fied, but many also felt Britain and France took the right course in 
chosing appeasement. The same poll which yielded these results reported 
that 60% or those· contacted felt there was now a greater possibility or 
. 16 
war, and, t., ct-..;i..\:is later, the number had ollrr.bed to 74%. 
As for United Stutes policy_, few wnntad Roosevelt to cdticize Hit-
17 
ler ~nd Mussolini during the crisi~. The vnst ;:najority thought the 
o-:>untry should st!\y out or Europenn quarrels, and only about one thlrd 
of those anr:wering pollcters in late o~+a.bc.r pla.c:.11d confidence ln 
the Preddent's nbilit:; to avoid war wit.heat tho guarantees of stronger 
18 
neutrality legislation. A significant poll reported t:1at. t:"le m.lj1Jrity 
of Americans felt that. if n. ::iajor European war came, t:1a JnH.ed Stat.es 
19 
woi11d b~ drawn into it. The people had be~ri badly fri3i1te~13d. by Hit-
ler• s militancy and they saw the d11n,~er of 1917 loc>:n.ing again •. 
Roosevelt., watching Europe sim:nar through October, was beginning 
to alter his concept of the American role in •o..... ·~onfrontation with 
Germany. On October ll)he called for $300.,0001 000 more to be spent on 
20 
defensq,in that fiscal year, and in a speoc:h the next day he strao~ed 
r 21 
the need for preparedness. 
The~1 on October 19/ Ambassador Joseph Kennedy announced ill London ) . 
that he thought the dictatorships and the democracie2 shoQld ranko a con-
oerted effort to work together for world peace. Reporters in the United 
States and abroad clamored to know if the speech had indicated a change 
. 22 
in foreign policy, and Roosevelt was forced to go on radio a week later 
to calm their fears. Once again stressing the need for adequate defense, 
the President made it abundantly clear that he planned no rapproachment 
23 
with the Nazis. "There can,be no peace," he said_, "if the reign or law 
24 
is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification or sheer force." 
In November violence burst out again in Europe, this time producing 
the strongest anti:-German reaction in the United States to date. A Po-
~~ l \ t.cO 
llsh Jew in Paris ·filled a German diplomat, and, on November 9 and 101 
., ~ "H·~~\ ':\ .. :--s4.dJ Germany GXplod~d in bloody po:;romri and '/\legislation which deprived the 
Jews of their few remaining rights. 
The President's reaction wa3 more thi~ time than n proteoting let-
ter. At a pres9 conference November 15, he announced the recall or Am-
-\.o G-¢ "'" r--.o.. f'I 1.-\. 2 '5 
basaarlor~H11gh R. l'iilson for consultation. Mr. Wilson never returned 
to Berlin. 
Press ~.nd public were equally horrified by the atroc:tties. The 
pogro11s, they felt, had been del.iberately planned and exocuted by the 
Hazis on tho oost obvio·1s of ;iretexts. The ~ Renubl.1.c wrote,, "Not 
since the end or the Great Wn.r hna Gerr.12.ny been a~ hated in the United 
26 
StatGn ns she is todny for her current treatment of the Jews." 
t.mb~ssad.or Hans !:!. Dieckhoff 1 lry.ter recalled in retaliation for 
Roose'felt' s ac"!:.i.on, re::"Jrted to Berlin th1t those A-:ierlc'\."ln who had been 
unco::i':l.itted tn their ~ttitude towar1 Germ~ny bef?~e we~e now definitely 
27 
~nti-..:.'Jer:n'ln. With s:t~ok~d a•1rprize he wrote 1 "Yesterday in nn: old Pro-
test.ant church in lfansach:1setts they went eo far !ls. to have a llabbi \!iCJ 
preach for the fir~t ti~e, departing from a 300-year-old tradition, in 
order to sho\·1 that in a situ~tion like the present they stand l;>y the 
28' 
Jews. 11 
Anti-German sentiment di4 not mean a change in isolationist senti~ 
ment, ho\\"9ver. The people still felt Europe was not their battleground. 
Changes were coming, but t~ey were mail'll.y in Washington. 
Chapter 3 
\·iinter, l 9.3S-.39 
It may have b~en the pogroms that finally convinced Roosevelt that 
he must return to the concept of collective security; probably all the 
reasons for his decision will never be kn~lm. Certainly pre3sura wa.s put 
o:i him by hl.s advise?-5. As early as September 31 cabinet members favored 
\ ~l 
aid to the democracies in eve~wcy po:rnible oh•Jrt or war. 
In ifovember William 6:lllltt returne1 fr,;,,.... "P~r\S. for cons'.llta-
ti.on and joined hie colle<:.gues in urging ::iov'3s to allow occ-nomic !\id to 
Brit.sin and Fr~nce. Tne ambassador felt Europe wo:..ild be at wt.r in the 
near future, which meant that even if the Unitod ;;t.'.\tes co'.lld stay ou.t, 
s~e ·"''Ould be auriouely hurt by the effect on ,,;orld trade. Britain and 
France nuet be supported, for they were the only buffers protecting her 
2 
from Gerir.any. Hull, as !1revio·1oly stated, also considered Hitler a 
greater in·:mace ttrnn did :!toosevelt, ."nd he, to,>, felt all mon.suret; pas-
sible 5~o~ud bo taken to !Jr~vent ·..;a:". 
Thus f;-."!' the Pre:;ident had n.Jt t~<en a ntand, e.o~0 b•., L~ .. tg-r 
("&..r~'-~S 
-e::'!: 1 'Jleac!l'n, because he sa.w no need to andAcec~.:.lS(! he h:d lost so b?.dly 
3 
i:i trie bi-electLms. In rrd.d-:fo·1e:m,or,, d~cidin:; t.h~ United ~tntes could 
n) longer stay coapletely aloof, he bo3an to for~ulato a pl~n to deal 
wtth Hitler, for it, was obvious to him by then that words were not 
enough. Jn Novembor 10, he · .. 1rote in a private ldtter, 110ur British 
friends must begin to fish or cut bait. The dictator threat from Europo 
is a good deal aloser to the United States and tne America~ Continent 
-\-lr\. t\_.,\'\ 4 
~it was before." 
Roosevelt chose to return the country to the system of collective 
security which she had abandoned in the mid-thirties. The President 
would continUB to use all his powers of persuasion to maintain peace in 
europe, but if such efforts failed, America must be ready to stand be-
ni.nd Britain and Franoe economically. Roosevelt still believed that the 
5 
clemocracies could defeat the Axis if they were properly supplied. 
During the last two months of 1938, the President cia..1.>)~G:.& a pro-
+o 'SCLl\d) -+-Co~,..~ w \...\ ~ "'""o.__\~ ~\ \ 
gramA~for a bulld-up in the sise of the armed forces and in arms 
production for hemispheric defense. His goas appear:)to have been three-
6 
fold: (1) he wanted the United States to be prepared for any eventuality; 
~2) he wanted to have munitions to sell to the democracies; (3) he wa.i-
ted Hitler to be assured that American aid would be more than mere moral 
support. 
Three obstacles to the realization of his goals confronted the Presi-
dent. First there were the pBople, second, the extreme isolationists in 
Congress, and thirs, the Neutrality Act. The presence of the arms em-
bargo and the absence of the cash and carry provision (It was due to ex-
pire May 1.) would block any atte:npt to aid Britain and France if they 
went to war. To have these sections of the Act changed, Roosevelt 
would have to break down the resistance both on and off Capitol Hill. 
On January 41 he delivered the'State of the Union Message!' to Con-
gress, and in it 'ht. ·c:.o..Uedl for reviews ot existing neutrality legis-
7 a 
lation and of the means tor hemispheric defense. 11 ••• The l«>rld has 
grown so small," the President said, " ••• that no nation can be safe ••• 
so long as any other powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances 
9 
at the council table." 
Definite proposals followt!d in other ziessages sent to Congress in 
January. The first called for preparations for i1er.listiheric de.f t!nse in 
the form of stronger air forces, stockpiles of i te;;is rer~uirint:; a long 
ti:ne to manufacture and of scare goods v;hic:1 had to be imported, im-
prove:nents in coastal defenses, and better fortifications to prott:lct the 
10 11 
Canal Zone. The second requested appropriations to expand the l.ir Force. 
In response to these proposals, isolativnists sprang to their feet, 
bitterly protesting any change in neutrality legislation. Then came two 
incidents whicn they could, and did use, to h:igh advc:ntd.ge. lin January 23, 
a bomber on a tr<.iining mission crashed in California, and the nev;s got to 
the press that a French official had bt:en on board. Isolationists all 
wer the coJ.ntry scree.med their objections to such a securit.y violo.tion 
and forced Roosevt:lt to ad1ait four days later t..ilat rie liad secretly 
authorized the sale of ple:.nes to Fr&:1;e. 
The President then ca:l_led the :~u tar~· Affairs Co:~..:ni ttee to the ·,foite 
House to soothe its -r~f..fled feathers. After the :r1et:ting tb.f.f-.,story leakt:d 
to the press t:-.at Roosevelt had said, 11 The American frontier is on the 
12 
Rhine." Again t!'-.e isolE.tionists seethed, and Senator ;.;ye led t:-,e chorus 
of opposition by refusing to attend the :-:ilite.ry J.ffairs Cor:i:nittt:::e mt.::etings 
13 
until their procedure \'las raade public. 
·;:-nether the peo;:ile ree.cted as violently e:.s Con~rees is doubt.t::u.l, but 
t'."le President felt he had to anewer his critics; so, on February J, he. 
called a press conference to restate his postioi:i. Roosevelt denied flatly 
that he had ever made the sta ter:1ent about the .:1.hi.ne, labelling the story 
14 
a "deliberate lie." The govern:nent stood for four principles in foreign 
policy: (1) free -world tra;de; (2) no entangling alliances; (J) Jisarrr;ament; 
t.4..a freedom. He had not, nor wo:..lid he ever, depart fro;;i the traditional 
position of the ~nited State$.15 
The announcement was designed to calm the public, not to appease 
Congress, for Roonevelt rarely conferred with Congressionnl leaders on 
foreign policy. He seems to have thought, ~~th conniderablc justificn-
tion, that little could bo gained by trying to plncate the extreme iso-
lationiats, and moGt of his appeals for support of Britnin and France 
16 
were directed at the people. 
The press reacted to these incidftnts with apprehension. They saw 
the ?resident's moves as attempts to frighten Hitler, as well as mea-
sures to insure adequate defense. Defense was important, but few felt 
the dictator would pay much attention to United States• action, and 
all concurred in believing that he was not satisfied, but only waiting. 
Public reaction was much the same. From the three month vantage 
point, most Americans still saw l'.unioh as the best that could have been 
done with a bad situation. A poll reported that 49.2% of those ques~ 
tioned blamed the crisis on Hitler's lust for power and 24% on Germa:ny•a 
17 ~ 
need for raw materials. The majority thought, as it had in September,(a•L O,.;ii; 
C..~p+ 
that if there should be a European war the United States would be drawn f" · "4 
lS 
in. Another poll revealed that 56% or those contacted felt the demo-
cracies, including America, should stop Hitler from taking any more ter-
19 
ritory, but then Hitler had not moved for three months. 
Unlike the more violent isolationists in Congress, most of the 
American people agreed with Roosevelt's rearmament proposals, 86% sup-
:ZD 
porting a larger navy, 82% a larger army, and 90% a larger air force. 
A majority, although smaller, also favored the sale of planes to France 
21 
on a cash and carry basis. Americans in January, 1939, a period of 
relative ceJ.CT, temporarily forgot the stories of tho devilish munitions 
maker::; and bec:ir:e more pro-Allies as they grew more anti-,A1xis. 
The old fears were still there, howevor, and Roosevelt knew it. 
Ickes records in his diary a lunch conversation l:ith the Pre3idont, 
January 28. Roosevelt said that if iiitlcr gained control of the s:nnll. 
S-:.iropea."1 countries only, he could .otill endanger the United Sta.tea eco-
nomically. ickee, ~re of an interventionist that the Chief Executive, 
replied that the people should be told. "He \liooseveltj said that it 
woald be absolutely impossible for him or for me to go on the air and 





ThrouGhout Februnry the isolntionictc continued to scre3r.l in Con-
gress nnd ln the r.cwa ncdic., but Roocevelt ignor~d thc:-:1 and concentrated 
on reports from nbro~d. In lntc Jnnunry rumors came that Hitler would 
1 
move by the end of tho next month agoinst ifostern Europe, but suboo-
quently the news grew m:>re cheerful. Anthony J, Biddlu, ambnsnador to 
Pol~.nd, wrote thn.t that ecvement .felt tho d.i..ctntor would t.urn h:tB at-
2 
tention to the colonies lost in the Pence of Veronillos. Kennedy's 
d11Jpatches reported that Chnrr.berlain/ thought Hitler w:mld tRke no action, 
that n Russo-German pact wa::; unlikely, and thnt any crisis which aro!3e 
3 
could be dealt with peacefully. Even the dispatches sent from Berlin 
/ 4 
by At tache Trilillan Smith were optimistic. 
One note of M1at should havo bean tal~en a.a a warning did come to 
Oi 1.,_~~ ... ' l""Q..~ 
Washington. Prentiss Gilbert, chargl'(in Ger:nany, wrote on February 24 
that nny and all action depended on Hitlor'e will, which was notoriously 
5 
h!ird to predict. Soon thereafter, the dictator proved the correctness 
or the Acerican'a estimation and shattered government optimism. 
On March 13, Berlin newspapers once more carried stories of Czech 
atrocities against Germans, The same day Bullitt reported that Hitler 
planned to move first on Czechoslovakia and then on Rwnania, and that 
6 
Brita.in and France were doing nothing, Raymond H. Geist, the new charge'~~«-~ 
in Berlin, confirmed this dismal !orecast, writing the same day that an 
7 
attack on the diS!'Ilembered neighbor was definite. 
That day Czech President Emil Hacha met with Hitler. He was con-
' . pletely helpless before the d•ctator, German troops crossed the border, 
an~ on March l~ Hitler entered Prague. 
a 
Roosevelt was furious. He had not trusted the Austrian before, 
but neither had he expected aggression to be so blatant, so swift, and so 
easy. Sumner Welles levelled a stinging attack on the final rape or 
Czechoslovakia two days later, saying, "It is manifest that acts of wan-
ton lawlessness and or arbitrary force are threatening world peace and 
9 
the very structure or modern vivillzation. 11 
~~~, Roosevelt had been debating since 
February whether he should return Ambassador Wilson to Berlin. The 
strain in relations with Germany had seemed to be easing, but the Presi-
dent feared the effect the action :night have on American public opin-
ion and on Hitler's estimation or United States• resolve to aid Britain 
10 
and France. By March 13 he had decided to send Wilson back, tor the 
~~~~~ ll 
diplomat was anxious to go. On .?I.arch l~f\all such plans were cancelled. 
l~H .. -t""O,_._"tS) \,.., \-"' 
-Motta~ also speculated that Roosevelt was considering a complete 
diplomatic break with Germany. He rejected, however, suggestions from 
Bullitt that he soundly renounce Hitler's action and go personally to 
12 
Congress to call for repeal of the Neutrality Act. 
At a cabinet meeting the seventeenth, Roosevelt presented his program 
or reprisals. The United States government would refuse to recognize 
the protectorate Hitler had set up in Prague. Countervailing duties 
would finally be levied against Germany in retaliation for taJCes it had 
already put on American goods, and the special privileges which had been 
13 
granted to impi;>rts fro~ Czechoslovakia were revoked. 
The press, as outraged as the government at Hitl~r's actiun, de-
clared that the dictator had finally revealed his true nature. Some 
periodicals expressed surprise, some said it was to be expected, but all 
agreed that any pretense of righting the wrongs done to German minorities 
was ridiculous. The march into Czechoslovakia should teach all who 
watched that Germany was capable of unlimited rapacity and treachery. 
Among most Americans, the reaction was the same. The German dhargb 
d' affaires in lfashington, Hans Thomsen, reported that the f;i.lblic felt Hit-
ler was never again to be trusted and that his desires for conquest were 
14 
not yet sated. In the minds of most men, the dictator had come to re-
present an enemy of every value they cherished. 
0" k 14. ,..c.L.,. l -; 
~ielles telephoned Bullitt/\ and, Yet still the aloofness remained. 
when summing up the American attitude toward the aggression, reflected, 
"It is a reaction to sor:1ething horrifying and shoc!dng, but not per-
15 
sonally connected •••• " 
An incident in late February illustrates the strength~of ant.:i:.:Qer-
,msn feeling in America when the ifazis acted closer to ho:ne. On ·,:ashing-
ton's birthday a rally of 20,000 members of the German~Arr.eric~n Dund was 
held at Hadison Square Garden. Police stood guard in l.:.rge numbers, but, 
even so, violent demonstrations against the ffibclting occurred in the 
streets surrounding the auditorium. The German consul general in Hew 
York, Borchers, wrote to Berlin that A~ericans saw the bund as an at-
tempt to weaken the country from within, and he urged his government to 
16 
dissociate itself from the organization. 
Throughout the year now under consideration, the Nazi organization 
drew little attention in press and polls; so one can assume the people 
generally disregarded iL. J.. rall;.,- on ',-iasl1ington 1 s birthday, however, 
garbed in all the respectibility of trauitional Americo.n patriotism, was 
a~parently more than ~-Jew Yorkers could tolerate. When. vit:·.\ring Bitler 
from a safe distance, their hatred of him could b1::: detached, but ifazi 
activity in their own country disgusted, inc-.;nsed, and perh.:..ps tlV<:::u 
frightened thern. 
:fows from Europe in tile wet::ks follm'iini:; the seizure of Czechoslo-
vakia contin'..led to dominate the front pages. On !·Iarch 23, Lithuania, 
under pressure, ceded the seaport of :-:emel to Ger;11any. A week la ttir 
Britain and France announced unqualified support of Poland. On April 7, 
r.:ussolini marched on :..1bania. 
The reports pouring into the State Depart•Hent wtlre even more alarm-
ing. Geist wrot.e from Eerlln that no om: could prt::c.iict 1-1;1=.1t wou:::..u ila}J-
p.:ln next. The Germ~ms hac.l a sense of mission, lie felt., wi1ich rnd.c.ie t.l1cir 
aggressiveness ff.ore than just a drive for lC1nd. T111::: ut::xt H1oves vwulc.l Le 
17 
eastward, and no a:uount of appease;at:::nt would have an;y bt::n1:::flcial 1:::fft::ct. 
Roosevelt. decided d.t this point to make anot.;1er attempt at talking 
Hitler into p1:::ace. ':ii1en he told null of :1is plan to send a :i<t::ssag1::: to 
the dictator, the Secretary of State said he clid not t;1ink it vmuld l1ave 
any positive results. He was still afrd.i<.l such letters would brand the 
. 
United States an appeaser and thereby hurt J.rnerican chances of influencing 
, 
Hitler in future cf'.isefl. Roosevelt agreed that the likelihood of success 
was small, but that at least all blame for war would be laid directly on 
13 
the Axis. 
Accordingly, the "Saturday ~urprize" \Ja~ sent. to Hitler and Musso-
lini on April 14. Proposing n European conterenco to settle i:uropean 
problems, it also called on the Axis powers to make an hon~ot statement 
of policy, which Roosevelt ~'Ould co1m1unicate to other world leaders. 
There followed a list of 31 European and Uear Eastern countries which 
they wore to prowiso not to attack for at least ten years, preferably not 
for 25. Finally, Roosevelt called for nn international conference con-
19 
cerning disarmament and world trade which the United States would attend. 
To dispel any isolationist fears, the President held a press con-
ference the next day. He stressed the fact that his proffered role was 
intermediary, not mediatoi; and that the United States would dit>cuss in 
conference only trade and disarmament, two issues about which she had 
20 
always been willing to talk. 
The offer, regardless of Roosevelt's statements to the contrary, 
was a departure from the withdrawal of the last four years, but Ameri-
cans, possibly welcoming any attempt to re~toro calm, reacted favorably, 
21 
although few thought it would have any effect. Then the7 waited tor 
the reply'. 
Mussolini 1 s answer came in a speech denouncing Roosevelt on April 20. 
Little attention was paid to him, however, for everyone knew his German 
master would give the real Axis answer. 
Bullitt reported that Hitler was angry that Roosevelt had f:elt 
called upon to meddle in Europe, but that he thought he must make some 
22 
reply to such a direct challenge. It came in the Reichstag speech of 
April 28. The Austrian was in a devastatingly sarcastic mood, and, after 
reiterating f:oz>.tibc t<ft: iz=•M.th atiime his justification of German actionts 
thus far and his new demands on Poland, he launcned into his answer to 
Roosevelt. He repeated the appeals of the Americo.n, twisted in ludi-
crous fashion, and then prefaced each robuttal with a clipped, 11Answer1 11 
which convulsed the Nazis before him. 
Europe could settle its problems bott~r, he said, if those not in-
volved would stay at home and tend to their own affairs. Tho unit~d 
Stntes was calling for an international conference, and yet Hitler re-
meobered that, at the international conference at Ve~sailles, America 
had done nothing to prevent the rape of Germany. In reply to the Presi-
dent's list of countries not to be attacked, the Austrian said he had 
contacted all of them nnd none felt threatened, but if they requested a 
guarantee of safety, he would certainly be more than nappy to give it. 
Drawing the speech to a close, Hitler, always an actor par excel-
lence, said ha'I!bly, "Mr. Roosevelt! I fully understand that the v•st-
ness of your nation and the immense wealth of your country allows you to 
~, . 
-gee! responsible for the history of the whole world •••• I, sir, am 
23 
placed in a much more modest and smaller sphere." He then, modestly, 
24 
painted a picture or hie role ae savior of Germany. 
Roosevelt was probably tu.rious, but there was nothing he could do. 
His offer had been ridiculed out of existence. Perhaps he found comfort 
in the fact that his punpose of laying blame on the Axis for any war to 
come ~~uld be fulfilled and that his message had placed the United States 
25 
firmly in the position of opposing all future aggression. 
Public reaction to the Reichstag speech was divided. Moderates 
thoueht it closed the door on any chance of peace; some isolationists 
saw a glimmer of hope in what they thought was a requeat for definite 
26 
peace proposals. Those ieolationists who were not so optimistic felt 
the dictator's intransigence was even more reason for etaying uninvol-
27 
ved. 
~·f.eanwhile;ths attitude toward nid to Europe had been changing. As 
the country became more anti-Ger.:nan, it gl'ew more willing to give eco-
28 
nomic help to the democr!l.oies. When e.i;ked to list the most pre~dng 
problems before the United States, however, those polled n~~ed, in or-
der 0£ importance: (1) ata.y5.ng out of war; (2) solving unemployment; 
29 
(3) recovery for businens. The old fear of being drawn in was still 
paramount, and the people had little faith in the ?reoident'a actions' 
30 
.having any effect on Europe. 
Dy the end of April, some hope that Europe would be able to solve 
her own problems began to,~grow, an optimism which would increase with 
the co:ning of summer. 1'hroughout the year in question, proepecte £eemed 
brighter when Hitler lapsed into relative inactivity, as he did in those 




T'ne summer or 1939 in Europe was an endless diplomatic maze or 
frantic activity over Danzig; in the United Stntes it was marked by pee-
simism in Washington and optimism in the rest of the country. 
Information pouring into the capital gave Roosevelt and his advisers 
!.n accurate view of the situation abroad, for, in addition to able work 
by the diplomatic service's regular channels, there were leaks in the 
1 
Jerman Foreign Office which supplied valuable reports. In rrl.d-May the 
feeling prevailed that war was lees likely; Britain anti France were 
2 
building alliances and Germany had economic troubles. Then came the 
old familiar pattern or Nazi-arranged uprisings of Germans, this time 
in the free port of Danzig, as Hitler renewed his demands for occupation 
ot that city and access to it through the Polish Corridor. Soon diplomats 
began p~edicting a m:>ve before the end of the su.amer. 
By P.ay
1
Roosevelt had long since abandoned any faith in appeasement, 
and Britain and France finally seemed determined to stand firm; so the 
.President turned his attention to revision of the Neutrality Act in the 
hope that such action would assure Hitler of American ability and in-
tention to aid the Allies. Although at that time non-violent solutions 
still seemed possible, the Chief Executive felt any steps that would 
further increase the probability of peace must be taken. 
On May 1, the cash and carry provision had expired. Roosevelt had 
entrusted renewal of it and revision of the Act to Senator Key Pittman, 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he had been bungling the 
3 
task since March, and in early 1-!ay he reported that passage was unlikely. 
The President, therefore, chose Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign 
Relations Committee, to introduce a new, even stroneer bill there. It 
called for repeal of the ar:ns etcl>a.rgo and rene-.:al of cash and carry, but 
it also gave the president the power to name an aggressor in a conflict 
4 
and levy sanctions accordingly. The bill was reported out of col':'Jilittee 
5 
favorably, but the vote was purely along party lines. The real .fight 
lay on the House tloor. 
Hull then wrote a letter to Pitt~an and Bloom stRtine E 1Vernment 
reasons for asking for the changoo. 
+- ~..., <l- " 0 ... ~ c. c:.J.- C) " fiGt,-t,o-atf-eot the rest of the world. 
'rhu United States was now too big -for .'' -
o...c;;..""Hv 
The aim of its foreign policy, 
snid the Secretary, must be :nnximum aecurity coupled with attitudes and 
6 
actions which would discourage war. 
In a conversation with Senate Republican leader Charles L. McNary 
before the introduction of the Bloom Bill, Hull asked his estimation of 
the chances for repeal of the arms em.b&rgo. The seasoned politician re-
plied, " ••• I guess you will be in for considerable trouble if you press 
repeal •••• .:Oo~e people feel pretty strongly, and =ioot of the rest don't 
7 
want to do anything now. 11 McNary' a analysis proved correct not only of 
the embargo, but of oash and carry as ·well. 
One pleasant incident drew attention away from Cor1gresoional h3g-
gling in early June. King George VI and ~uenn Zlizabeth, after a visit 
to Canada, came to Washington. Ure. Roosevelt \'Tote that the President 
considered England America's "first line of defense," so that he planned 
8 
the trip to rally public suppobt. The presence of royalty in the White 
House caused considerable consternation over protocol; Bullitt even 
sent the First Lady a detailed, secret memorandum recording the proper 
9 
way to receive a king and queen. Despite much strain for the profes-
si.onal worriers and an unusually severe heat wave, the visit was a euc-
cess, and the royal couple captivated everyone. 
Kr~ ~""" .. L" 
The isolationists in the House reclaimed the stage~George and~liza-
beth vacated, and if they were not as charming, they were considerably 
more vocal, as they rose to protest each major section of the Bloom Bill. 
The arms embargo and non-renewal of cash and carry were necessary, they 
felt, to protect this country from foreign involvement. The opposition 
pointed out that refusal to sell would directly aid the Axis, since Bri-
tain, controlling the seas, would be the only country capable of buying 
rrom the United States. Representative Hamilton Fish replied that neu-
10 
trality meant:.playing no part in a war. If the United States acted to 
"'-t-1 p . 
-hwlp. the Allies by repealing the embargo, it would be "endeavoring to 
11 
take sides before war is declared." 
Supporters of Roosevelt's position tried to point out the inconsis-
tency of the isolationist position by saying that trade in other commo-
dities was as necessary to maintain an army as munitions, and yet the 
objection was just to dealing in munitions. Fish answered that anyone 
who wanted to engage in commerce with belligerents would do so at his 
own risk, with the government taking no aotion when his goods were des-
12 
troyed at sea. 
Perhaps the II¥lSt bitterly protested point of the bill was the new 
passage which er.ipowered Roosevelt to name and then levy sanctions 
against an aggressor. The isolationists freely admitted that they did 
not truet the Chief Executive; Representative George H. Tinkham branded 
13 
the Bloom proposnls 11a bill for war at the pleasure of the president." 
~le and his colleagues felt Roosevelt had dangerounly interventionist 
viewe, and if he we:-e given s~c::i power he Wullld, by labellins one nation 
cJ f'rttvh 
responsible for a war, prepare the way for the United States to be ~a 
in on the ot!1er side of the quarrel, 
In resistance to the bill., all the old, fa.tlliar arguments were 
brought out, and in final defense so:ne men even voiced assurances that. 
peace would la.st. R~presentative ;ar1 T, Curtis, after damning the 
rawrl.tlons makers as warcont;ers, said cal.ml.y, "T'ne people or ",hose coun-
t.rie::; are all good people. It iu the people i·:ho .~sht the w.:irs, not 
~ 
the govern:nenta. 11 
R~pres~ntativo Edouard ?J.H. Izac :r..i:nmed up ieolationist reasons for 
" 
oppooi:ig any ohange in exiJting neatrallty legislation by saying, "You 
must uctually put an iron ring around the ':iestern He:nisphere a.nd keep 
ev~rybody out of there, but it cannot bo dono according to international 
)$. 
law. 11 
T'no Bloom Bill passed J;.iue 301 but it had been Emaf3culated by am-
mencblu~ts which deleted the renowal of cash and carry, denied Roosevelt's 
l.r.6 
power to name an aggressor, and restored the nrma e:nbargo. It did not 
even reach the floor of t~e Senate, for it was shelved July 13 by the 
11: 
Foreign Relati~ns Conrnittee on a vote of 12 to 11. 
The isolationists• reasons for r~jecti.::..; th~ bill were a :nixture 
of their old foars, partizans!up, distrust o! the President, and a genu-
ine feeling that there would b3 no war before Jan~ary. The majority of 
Congress remained largely apat~etic and allowed the minority to have its 
way. and Roosevelt hi~self bunglad his role. 
Tne President did not pllsri for passage wi t.!1 his typical fervor un-
til it was too late, because, sorr.e feel, he was afraid of showlng t.l1e 
13 
world how strong isolationist sentiment really was. .After the bill 
had died, as reports from i::urope becn.m8 : .. v~ •.; and more alarming, he re-
fused to give up the fight. Dllllitt wrot..e in ln.Le June that a ci'isis ,,.;as 
likely as soon a.s the Ger!f,an ar.7JY finished it 1aanuvers in July. German 
19 
troops had already begun infiltrating Danzig. Anthony J. Biddle dis-
oatched fro~ Foland on July 12 the re.Dort that a peaceful settlement 
. 20 
was doubtful. 
On July 141 Roosevolt ::;cnt a oessage to Gong!·e::;s urging pa.~rn:ige, 
and tour days lnter ho cmlled Soruitorit.l. loaders to the \ihite House to 
convince tha.l'. to chang;:, their vote. Senator ':lillia.m .s. Borah proceeded 
to infuriate Hill, reportedly-bringing tears of rage to his eyes, by ~ay-
22 
ing tnat his dOi.lrCilO in Zuropv did not pred.ict war. 
m.o:ioirs al.moot ton ydars later, the Secretary was stlll angry at thia 
elur on the work or the diplomatic service, and ha said sarcautically 
23 
that Bora.'1 • s source was a minor pross ser.o.:.c..: in London. Hull closed the 
chapter uith these v-.-orcis: 
Trying to wln over the ~solationist.s was for wo 
a nerve-racking and back-breaking experience. 
As I looked at. the isolationists ••• , they ramin-
ded me of the somnambulist who walks within an 
inon of a tho~sand-foot precipice without bat-
ting an eye. 24 
On July 21, Roosevelt held a press Conference, and, when the quea-
tion of neutrality legislation was raised, the Presidont sa.id that the 
Senate must take the bllin:.e for not acting. Europe would go to war in 
the irr~':lediate future; to shelve the bill had been to declare to hi::1 tnat 
25 
it was inevitable. 
Roosevelt and Hull thought that Hitler would be encouraged by' the 
refusal to act, both because Brita.in and France could not buy from the 
United States and because the country had shown an unwillineness to 
stand behind them. Samuel I. Rosenman, a close associate of the Pres-
dent's for many years, wrote, "~lthough he denied it specifically, I 
know from what he said frequently that he did feel a great deal of bit-
terness at the frustration of one of his last and best hopes for ,:.-.e.:i.ce. 11 
iihether this r1ope in the power of iunerican actions over Germany was 
justified is doubtful. iiull wrote that diplorr,a.ts told him rejection or 
2.7 
the act would encourage :IiLler. "dilliam L. Si1irer, correspondo.nt in 
Berlin, conv<::rsely said t.hot he m~ver he.ti any indication that s\.U11JHer tLat 
211 
3err:i.a.n officic.ls paid any attention to tht: Unit.ed .Jtates. 
derson, British ambassador, J.ot::::i not even mention the event in his record 
29 
of his mission. ~vi<leuce points to ti1e fact that riitler i1d<l alreauy 
made his plan:; when the Sew:..te refused to act. In i·:a.y i1e had told a 
group of his generals that the cletermination to ::iecure iJanzii; wuulc.l mean 
\;ar, out tirn.t it was a risk wi1ich must be taken to fulfill Gerr11any' s 
30 
Lebensrau.rn. 
In late :-:ay German Charg~ d' affa.ir<::s Thomsen, esti:natine ;..merica' s 
attitudes and military strength, wrote ti1cit t!1e country did not want to 
fight abroad, but that Roosevelt was trying to stir up the people. Al-
though he habitally oversta:..ed the President's power and bis natrer..i of 
Germany, he rightly felt that no IJ.ilitary aid could be sent to Eur9pe for 
31 32 
some time. T'nomsen ha.d held this view since at least !·:arch, and he main-
33 
ta.ined it through the rest of the sum~er. S:1ch reports probably en-
couraged nitle ar morP than any Gon£res~ional stuooornoss, f he paid 
attention to the ~ni~ed ~tates at all:) 
Pre~s reaction to the rejection of the neutrnlity ler,islation varied. 
Some periodicals thoURht it bad; eo~e said it rrnde no difference. They 
correctly judged that the reasons for shelvin~ were portizanr.hip, dis-
trust of Roosevelt, enc irolntiorism, with the latter bein~ the most fre-
ouently named. Unlike the Con~ressmen, the journnlistr. thou~ht the pro-
s~ect~ for pence in Eurone were ~owinG rliYlr.!er by the dny. 
The neople, however, 21nw hone i.n the future. In Janu~ry, 41._'f; of 
those polled thour,ht there would be a Eur~pean war within the year. 
With the Czech cr1sis the fieure roce to 51%, but by t':'.\y 1 t h:1d dro:pped 
34 
to J~, and July S~W rt down to 2J~. Still, a lnrre rr.ajority h~d con-
fidence in the abi 11ty of Br:f.tP.in, Friince, ~ RilSsia to defeat the Axis, 
35 
if nee~ sary. The Allies hed ftnqlly t~~en a firm ~tand, ~nd the 
people felt Hitler wo~ld now thin'c twice before provoking war. After 
all, he had been quiet for four mont~e. 
Chapter 6 
War, 1939 
Roosevelt and Hull knew Europe was far from peace. As the possi-
bility or war loomed larger, the President focused his attention on the 
alliance negotiations between Britain, France, and the USSR. He did 
not like Stalin, but he was tolerant of him and he considered his aid 
1 
necessary if the Allies were to stop Hitler; so in late July he again 
took the course or written persuaatbn·;; ... 
A top secret message was cabled to Paris and carried from there to 
Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt in Moscow by courier. Roosevelt urged 
Stalin to unite with Britain and France, but declared that he could do 
nothing about the terms or an alliance. 'lbe sending of the letter was 
2 
to be kept secret. 
Steinhardt wrote back to Hull that Moscow's leader was mainly con-
cerned about the rising menace or Japan. If Hitler turned on Russia, he 
would have to go through Poland and Rumania tirst, and, Stalin reasoned, 
3 
such action would bring a declaration of war from Britain and France. 
Meanwhile, gloomy reports poured into Washington r1•om abroad. 
Pierrepont Moffat predicted on August 2 that Ge~ would move by the 
4 &'o-~\n..s 
end or the month. Alexander c. Kirk, oharg,1'4-n Berlin, "'Tote six days 
later that Hitler would act by mid-September, and the Americ§n echoed 
the confusion ot diplomats forced to deal with a government completely 
s 
dominated by such an enigmatic, volatile man. 
With Hitler applying pressure to Poland in the manner by now so 
familiar, Roosevelt prepared for war. Lan:ge1 end Gleason :f'eei rie acted 
P, &. r ~~ S A. ~CL I'\ ""-\ l'\C.. 
slowly, the~ revealing -hW"'reluctanoe to admit that little hope was 
6 
left. On August 4, the War Resources Board was set up to administer 
neutrality, and $10,0001 000 became available to build stockpiles. 
Two days· later Welles instructed Biddle to tell Jo sir Beck, Polish 
foreign minister, that Poland must not make the first l'lX>Ve, lest she be 
7 
branded an aggressor. Bullitt reported on August 11 that French lea-
8 
ders felt that a "crisis [could come] in any 24 hours." 
For the last two weeks of the month the wires to Washington screamed 
warnings"'from Europe. Kirk reported in a handwritten message that Hitler 
9 
was not r.onvinced that Britain and France would stand firm; Daladier 
10 
told Bullitt the attack would come in eight days; Bullitt wrote that 
11 
~he French !or the first time saw no hope. 
Then, August 24, the non-aggression pact between Russia and Ger-
many was signed. Roosevelt, rushing back to Washington from a fishing 
trip oft Canada, hoped that Spain, Italy, and Japan would bo disillu-
12 
sioned, but he also teared the appeasing tendencies of the Allies. 
Opinion in the State Bepartment varied over the full effect of Germany's 
13 
diplomatic triumpp, but no one f alt cheerful. 
Once again messages were sent, this time to Hitler, Victor Emmanuel, 
the king of Italy, and Ignace Moszicld., president of Poland. Roosevelt 
proposed negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, with his role that 
14 
or intermediary. Moffat wrote in his diary that everyone knew the at-
tempt was doomed, but that the message had to be sent. 
,, 
,, ••• Any chance 
sould be taken and above all ••• the record should be abundantly clear," 
lS 
he said. Two days earlier, on August 22, he had set the odds !or 
16 
peace at 7S to 25. 
The country was stunned by the announcement or the pact. For years 
Nazis had screamed foul epithets at communismJ now they united with it 
and the two g1ante ot Europe joined in a manmoth war machine. The press 
cried that the announcement marktld a disaster. War seemed inevitable. 
The public reacted with the same shocked contueion, as no one 
seemed to know what would happen. The old hatred of Communism flared 
up again. Everyone felt the dictatore had proved their natural trea-
che17' and had given the United States even greater reaeon for doing its 
17 
utmost to avoid entanglement. 
On August 25, Roosevelt held a cabinet meeting to announce the emer-
gency measuree he had taken. The Treasury Department would require 
clearance tor all toreighnships in American ports. It war came, ha would 
urge the departments ot State and Justice to delay the neutrality dec-
laration, au that as JDJlah arms and equipment as possible could be got 
18 
to Britain and France. In a press conterence the same day, Roosevelt 
said war was not certain, but his optimism must have been based more on 
19 
hope than tacts. 
The ?resident and the State De~~r~ment correctly thought that there 
wo•.ild be no rapproachment this time, because Poland seemed determined to 
stand firm, assured that Britain and France would be forced to support 
her. So desperate was Chamberlain that he told Kennedy to suggest to 
Tne ~nited States that it put pressure on the Poles to back down, but 
20 
t:ashington scornfully rejected the idea. 
The last day or the month Hitler sent his reply to the President's 
peace message, and its complete denial of any German g1.rl.lt for the crisis 
:21 
snuffed out hope that A.~erica co~ld help avert war. Moffat swnmed up 
feeling in Washington when he wrote, fhe ~last two days ~ugust 26 and 2i} 
have given me the feeling of sitting in a house where somebody is dying 
upstairs. There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense con-
22 
tinues unabated." 
The next press conference at the White House convened to hear Roose-
velt announce the invasion of Poland on September 1. In anBWer to the 
question or whether the United States could stay out of war, the Presi-
23 
dent said, " ••• I not only sincerely hope so, but I believe we can. 11 
Two tlays later he repeated ttds assurance in a "fireeide chat'; ~ 1 adding 
to the original draft of the speech his opinion that Americans could not 
24 
be expected to rer.iain neutral in thought as well ae in deed. War had 
only strengthened his resolve to rally American support for the Allies. 
On September 8 the Presitlent declared the neutrality of the United 
~ 0 t"\ "° ,+c.._., b c.r t 3 
States. Congress was ce1led into special session,to repeal the arms 
embargo, which the !:J.8jority now consented to do, and the bill became law 
on Noverr.ber 4. 
cv..c..a.. _, 'ai-~ 
Roosevelt's reacto.& 1 to the end of ea y;eM" ef it1:!"8f'ean blandex s 
nm:s~ save ~••R a ~·ill'• o' sorrow and foreboding. He had spent that 
year trying to convince leaders abroad to confer over their differences, 
and all the effort had been wasted. 
Once again attention must be turned to the idea that Roosevelt 
~ pA:rt.t\4- I 1 ._s \ a..+c.. o..~ 
plannecl for United States intervention. ,._f. 1 September,, :b&nge!'-&nd-Gl:e&-
'eoft fe~l he honestly thought the ~...+1~ could stay 011t of actual con-
25 
nict, while supplying Britain and France economically. Hull says, al-
though writing trom a vnhtage point or almost ten years, that he and the 
26 .\2..o ~L r-\-
Preside~lt always worked to avoid entanglement. ·Roget"t- !Jherwood,, one ot 
Roosevelt's ghost writers, advances the thesis that the Chief Executive's 
reaction to the outbreak of the war was an underestimation or German 
power a~d a fenr or appeaserr.ent by the Allies that would allow Hitler 
to ream, rally the support or his people and partners, and play on iso-
2!7 
lationist sentiment in the \-lest. Mrs. Roosevelt writes that her hus-
band never thought war was inescapable and that he continually said he 
28 
hoped that, if it came, the United States could stay out. 
If these close observero nre wrong,, if Roosovelt really h~rbored 
a desire to eend American troops abroad,, the fact remains that from Sep-
tember,, 1939 to December, 1941, all he af>ked for wns economic aid to 
+o +~t- A- l \ l u lo l ..... + 
the Allies. T·~G.... L\:!i.~0"1 . .1&. t...lust..r:/\ did not ento~ the war 
until she.-vaa attacked. 
Press and public reaction to the invasion or Poland are easier 
to see. The press thought Britain and France would be the winners or a 
war fought in trenches. A stalemate would develop, with Britain con-
trolling.the seas and France holding Germany at the Maginot Line. No 
one understood Hitler's blitzkreig or foresaw the brillance of his un-
29 
conventi~nal tactics. 
~s;for the United States,, it could stay out, and the preGs agreed 
on the o~urse the country should take. The neutrality laws should be 
enforced, after having :Ce stored cash and carry. The government should 
act to prevent the growth or belligerent credit here. Above all, Amari-
cans must remember World War I, and they must trµly want to remain tm-
30 
involved. 
The people shared these views, They blamed Hitler fully for pro-
voking the war, and thought Britain and France had been right in stand-
ing firm. On August 17, on~ 12% of those questioned wanted the Allies 
31 
to give in. In mid-September, 73% answering pollsters believed Eng-
32 
land and France should stand by Poland. On& ~onth later, with that 
33 
country in ruins, 79% polled thought the Allies ehould remain at war. 
The year since l'.unich had taught Americans that appeasement would not 
work. 
Like the press, the people believed Germany would lose. In early 
October, 64% of those polled favored Britain and France; two weeks later 
the tigure had risen to 71.%. Of those answering in such a manner, 62% 
34 
said they were very confident of an Allied victory. 
America could stay out if she wanted, but she must make a concerted 
""'",-()""' ~"+ "'-~~ -~~s;-4-
errort to do so. Orie-observep wrote, 11We are as'a~il.ation undoubtedly 
suffering trom a psychosis, a .tear that. we shall be trapped into war in 
35 
wpite or ourselves." The polls revealed that Amerioane still felt the 
36 
entrance into World War I had been a mistake, The majority believed 
Roosevelt should remain aloof from the crisis and concentrate on keeping 
37 
the country uninvolved. 
As tor the policy he should pursue, a Roper poll reported that 
opinion was divided. Only 37.5% of those queationed supported the re-
o. "J) C 0 ""-f l C.. ~ ,....._ ; l ~, ~'-r- ~~l f\(;) ·"' -- t I\. • .. H) \ :,,) t. ~-
newaJ. of caish and carry r · · . . · -
"'fhe next largest number (29.9%) felt the coWltry should not even rein-
state tho defunct measure. Few (14.7%) supported entrance into the war 
if the Allies faced defeat, and even fewer (8.9%) proposed supplying 
.3B 
Britain, France, and Poland, ~hile refusing to sell to Germs.ny. 
Deopite the fact that polls are a deceptive form of evidence, they 
do indicate opinions, and in conjunction with press and governmental reac-
tione, theed surveys substantiate the thesis upon which thio paper has !. 
been built. Although more opposed 1~ Hitler than they had been a year 
tmrller, although, a!ter the initial war scare coolod, nDre \dlling to 
aid Britain and Franc~, Americans in the fall of 19J9 were i;till basi-
cally isolationist. The old feeling that war was fruitleos rernn.ined, 
and with it the fear that somohow Ahe United Stateo wo:tl.d be forced once 
again to tight a European war for the benefit or Europeans. 
CA.4' H. ok. ~::>-.rk .. 
Franklin Rooaovolt called his wifeflP,t 5 a~m., September 1, to teU 
her of the invasion, and her reaction was peobably the ca.;nc as that or 
l..VO lt-4-
many Americans, even if few would admit it. She weked. two friends, and 
the three ladies ant together in tho early morning • 
• • • a sense of impending disaster wao on us. The 
thing w~ had feared had finally come, and we 
seemed t.o know that sooner or later we would be 
dragged into the vortex with all the European 
countries •••• I had a feeling that ••• thero wae 
not much chance for any part of the world to es-
cape it, though in the r:ieantime we hoped for some 
miracle_. 39 
Mrs. Roose~elt wa:; right. America would not escape the war against 
which her husband had fought and into which Europe had blundered. Hit-
ler would destroy the re:nnanta of Pax Brittanxa, forcing the United 
States to lead th~ tree world, for isolationism, an earneot desire to be 
left al.one, could not survive the death of the old order. 
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